

Other topics

Chapter 16 -- Security

A big deal for OSes

- ☐ Ignoring network security which is really the responsibility of the OS
- ☐ Security for the OS -- kinds of attacks
 - ☐ breach of confidentiality -- unauthorized reading of data
 - ☐ breach of integrity -- modification of data
 - ☐ breach of availability -- resource not available
 - ☐ theft of service -- unauthorized use of resources
 - ☐ denial of service -- fork bombs (minor) ...
- ☐ Attack methods
 - ☐ masquerading
 - ☐ replay attack -- replay of valid data ...
 - ☐ message modification
 - ☐ man in the middle attack
 - ☐ session hijacking
 - ☐ privilege escalation

☐ Levels of security

- ☐ physical
- ☐ network
- ☐ operating system
- ☐ application
- ☐ human

Application Level

- ☐ Malware and Trojan Horse programs
 - ☐ Major problem of "free" programs on Internet
 - ☐ not as much for open source programs
- ☐ Trap Door
- ☐ Logic Bomb
- ☐ Stack and Buffer Overflows, Code injection
 - ☐ major source of privilege escalation
 - ☐ code run on the stack
 - ☐ `execvp("/bin/sh",)`

☐ Viruses

- ☐ file
- ☐ boot
- ☐ macro
- ☐ rootkit
- ☐ source code virus
- ☐ polymorphic -- changes signature
- ☐ encrypted
- ☐ stealth
- ☐ tunneling -- interrupt handler/device drivers
- ☐ multipartite -- various locations in the system
- ☐ armored -- hard to figure out what it does.
- ☐ ransomware -- encrypts data, ransom for unlock code

System and Network Threats

- Default install of an OS

- Many services enabled by default
- Very few services enabled by default

- worms -- 1988 internet worm, Robert Morris

- gets() buffer overflow, ...
- Sobig worm, 2003, photo, target, MS windows

- Port Scanning -- find out what services are available

- Denial of Service -- various forms, network, CPU, ...

- DDOS -- Distributed denial-of-service attacks

Cryptography as a Security Tool (16.4)

- encryption -- a primary tool for security
 - passwords on UNIX, ...
- Symmetric Encryption: $M = D_k (E_k (M))$
 - DES -- data-encryption standard, 64 bit value, 56 bit key
 - Triple DES ... 3 keys: $E_{k3}(D_{k2}(E_{k1}(M)))$
 - AES -- 2001, keys of 128, 192, or 256 bits, 128-bit blocks
 - Not good for long messages ...
- Asymmetric Encryption: RSA, public key/private key systems
 - Two keys: Private K_v , Public K_p
 - $M = D(K_v, E(K_p, M))$
 - $M = D(K_p, E(K_v, M))$
 - Privacy: E with K_p
 - Signing: E with K_v

☐ Authentication -- limiting potential senders

- ☐ Also helps prove a message has not been modified
- ☐ md5, SHA-1, other hash functions can be authentication
- ☐ also digital signatures, RSA allows anyone to verify signature

☐ Key Distribution

- ☐ Symmetric encryption requires key distribution
- ☐ reason for asymmetric encryption
 - ☐ Still can have a man-in-the-middle attack
- ☐ Digital certificates by a trusted, well known authority

☐ Implementation of Cryptography

- ☐ Multiple layers -- networking issues here
- ☐ Read 16.4.3 about TLS (Transport Layer Security)

User Authentication (16.5)

How do you know the user is allowed access?

- ☐ passwords

 - ☐ How to store passwords

 - ☐ Easy to guess passwords vs good passwords

 - ☐ User or System Generated (X-machine at LLNL)

 - ☐ One time passwords and two-factor authentication

 - ☐ Challenge / Response systems

 - ☐ App based 2-factor systems

- ☐ Biometrics

 - ☐ fingerprints

 - ☐ require both a fingerprint and a password

 - ☐ face recognition?

 - ☐ ear "print"?

 - ☐ other?

Total security policy is typically beyond the OS

- ☐ OS can provide tools

- ☐ Organization must use tools

- ☐ People must have buy-in for a security policy to work

- ☐ Must be a "living document"

Security Defenses

Defending from attack, both external and internal

- ☐ defense in depth -- many layers of defense are better than few
- ☐ Vulnerability Assessment:
 - ☐ Risk assessment
 - ☐ test scripts vs source code
 - ☐ Penetration testing
 - ☐ network scans
 - ☐ file system scans
 - ☐ process scans
 - ☐ US Gov ... only as secure as its most far reaching connection
- ☐ Intrusion Detection
 - ☐ honeypot -- to trap attackers
 - ☐ monitoring of system ... has some similarity to penetration testing
- ☐ Virus Protection
 - ☐ virus scanners
 - ☐ sandbox
- ☐ Read remainder of chapter (16.6.5-16.8)

Protection (Chapter 17)

Controlling access of processes and users

- ❑ Discussed initial versions earlier.
 - ❑ Access control lists, domain systems
- ❑ Goals
 - ❑ originally: protect from "untrustworthy" users
 - ❑ now: protect from untrusted environments (e.g. internet)
 - ❑ as well as untrustworthy users
 - ❑ and "bad actors"
 - ❑ down to "authorized" vs "unauthorized" users
- ❑ Need to provide tools for resource protection
 - ❑ system administration as well as "normal" users
- ❑ Principles of protection
 - ❑ Principle of least privilege
 - ❑ UNIX: users should not run as root except to run privileged commands
 - ❑ Compartmentalization (e.g. http runs as http user)
 - ❑ Audit trails
 - ❑ Defense in depth

Protection rings

- ☐ Kernel by definition is trusted and privileged
- ☐ Privilege separation
 - ☐ rings of privilege
 - ☐ inner rings have more privilege
 - ☐ want operations at greatest level possible
 - ☐ hardware "rings" like RISC-V machine/supervisor/user
 - ☐ Software, MULTICS had rings of privilege
 - ☐ Minix: micro-kernel + set of processes at lower privilege
 - ☐ Android: multiple layers of privilege
- ☐ Domains of protection
 - ☐ Generalization of rings, but no hierarchy
 - ☐ OS contains processes and objects
 - ☐ objects may be hardware objects
 - ☐ Each object is named, has specific allowed operations
 - ☐ Domain: collection of objects with allowed operations (may be fewer than full access)
 - ☐ Domain definition may change
 - ☐ Will need some way for dynamic domains

- ❑ Access matrix: domain X object, "access rights"

 - ❑ Unix domains: Users

 - ❑ Android domains: Application based

- ❑ Process may ask to switch domains

- ❑ Need a way to manage the Access matrix

- ❑ Actual implementations

 - ❑ Global table

 - ❑ Row implementation -- Capability Lists

 - ❑ Once given, how to revoke?

 - ❑ Column implementation -- Access Control Lists

- ❑ Need management of rights in all cases

- ❑ Other methods used for protection

 - ❑ Darwin: property lists & entitlements

 - ❑ System-call filtering -- attacks come via system calls

 - ❑ Sandboxing -- limiting environments of processes

 - ❑ Language based protection

 - ❑ compiler based checks

 - ❑ run time enforced (protection in Java)

Virtual Machines / Virtualization (Ch 18)

☐ Basic concept: make one machine appear as many (identical systems)

- ☐ run two (or more) operating systems at the same time
- ☐ want a minor performance penalty
- ☐ have some central, trusted manager
- ☐ Virtual Machine vs Emulator

☐ Past Virtual Machines

- ☐ IBM mainframes in 1972 ...
 - ☐ VM370 -- provided several VMs
 - ☐ Each VM usually ran a single-user OS
- ☐ Not Quite Virtual Machines (emulators): p-machine, JavaVM,

☐ Current VM like systems

- ☐ Hardware based systems (IBM LPARs, Oracle LDOM)
- ☐ VMMs -- software based VMM control, "below OS"
 - ☐ VMware ESX, XenServer, SmartOS, MS HyperV (By windows)
 - ☐ All OSes run "on top of" the hypervisor
 - ☐ One OS is normally controls the hypervisor

Current VM like systems (page 2)

☐ Applications that provide a VM for same architecture

- ☐ VirtualBox, VMWare workstation, parallels, qemu-*

- ☐ Virtual environment "inside the application"

- ☐ Code runs at machine speed with hardware assist

- ☐ VM and guest must be same architecture (CPU)

☐ Paravirtualization -- guests know they are talking to a VM

- ☐ e.g. simplified Disk Driver module ...

☐ Emulators -- run a different machine than the host

- ☐ qemu-*, armware, spike(RISC-V)

- ☐ Can emulate new architectures never built, e.g RISC-V (before it was built)

☐ Programming environment virtualization: .net, JavaVM, GNU bc, ...

☐ Application Containment

- ☐ BSD Jails, Solaris Zones, Docker (docker.com), ...

Benefits of VMs

- ☐ Run multiple OSes
- ☐ Easy migration
- ☐ Cloud computing
- ☐ OS experimentation

Basic tools

- ☐ Trap and emulate -- "guest" OS executes a privileged instruction
 - ☐ Binary Translation ... e.g. some instructions don't trap
- ☐ Special hardware to support virtual machines, fast VM context switches

Read the rest of the chapter for more information

One use of virtualization

isr.cmu.edu -- Internet suspend/resume project (mostly dead now)

- ☐ Mobile computing -- cuts "tight binding between PC state and PC hardware"
- ☐ Server -- a distributed FS and VM state storage
- ☐ Client runs on a VM (minor slowdown is possible)
- ☐ Client host has VM & access to network
- ☐ User authenticates to VM server, runs a VM on client host
- ☐ Client host doesn't see anything other than encrypted files
- ☐ Client OS needs to allow ISR agent access to net and provide a device
- ☐ User OS runs on VM.
 - ☐ Can suspend VM, save to server
 - ☐ Go to different hardware, get state from server, continue
 - ☐ ISR agent doesn't need to load ALL state from server
- ☐ Most recent work appears to stop Aug 25, 2015

Distributed vs. Parallel

- Parallel, geographically close, same or highly cooperative OSes
- Distributed, geographically distant, different or low cooperative OSes
- Not hard and fast rules
 - Amoeba -- A single OS that runs on a group of computers on a LAN
 - officially dead.
 - Inferno -- Plan 9 based, last release March 28, 2015
 - Applications in "Limbo" language, target for Dis VM
 - Dis code could easily be translated for host
 - Produces a homogeneous environment accross multiple platforms
- HarmonyOS, OpenHarmony
 - Huawei developed, smartphone, tablets, ... IoT devices
 - 2012 in-house beginnings
 - OpenHarmony released in 2020
 - microkernel-based system
 - shipped devices with Harmony in 2021
 - uses linux/android apps or LitsOS for small systems (eg. watch)
- BlueOS, open source
 - Developed by Vivo, a Chinese company
 - Has some features similar to HarmonyOS

Why distributed?

- ☐ Resource Sharing
- ☐ Computation Speedup
- ☐ Reliability
- ☐ Communication
 - ☐ Multi-site systems
 - ☐ Migration from large mainframes -> Network of Workstations
- ☐ Availability of so many machines ... phones, routers,
- ☐ Be able to use existing resources when idle

Distributed OS

☐ Three different views

- ☐ Each workstation has its own user base ... need to login on every machine
- ☐ One login on distributed system, don't know which machine you are using
- ☐ Same login for all machines, machines not a distributed OS.

☐ Issues

- ☐ Data migration
- ☐ Computation migration
- ☐ Process migration
 - ☐ Load balancing
 - ☐ Computation speedup
 - ☐ Hardware preference
 - ☐ Software preference
 - ☐ Data access / Resource need

☐ Kind of network -- LAN vs WAN

- ☐ naming -- somewhat solved by DNS
- ☐ routing -- static vs dynamic
- ☐ Connection: circuit, message, packet ...
- ☐ Not going to do too much networking here ...

Robustness

- ☐ Failure Detection
- ☐ Reconfiguration
- ☐ Recovery from Failure
- ☐ Fault Tolerance

Scalability and Transparency

- ☐ how does the system scale to larger and larger systems
- ☐ does the "user" notice how big the system is?

Hadoop -- Open source map/reduce engine with a distributed FS

- ☐ currently part of the Apache family
- ☐ designed to run on a cluster of commodity computers

Lustre -- parallel file system, lustre.org.

- ☐ Used on many high end HPC systems.

DCE/DFS -- not a full distributed OS, tools for distributed systems

- ☐ Remote Procedure Calls, Distributed Objects, Security, Web ...
- ☐ DFS essentially AFS with modifications

Distributed File Systems (19.6)

A method to share the same files across a distributed system

□ Issues:

□ Model? client/server vs peer-to-peer

□ Naming of files

□ location transparency

□ location independence

□ File migration

□ Caching, block vs whole file

□ write-through policy

□ consistency

□ client vs server updates to cache

□ Replication, storing files on multiple servers/hosts

□ replication coherence

□ replication updating

□ Semantics (see storage slides): UNIX, session, immutable shared file

AFS -- Andrew File System

- ☐ C/S model, read replica servers, one write server
- ☐ whole file caching, session semantics
- ☐ client requires access to at least one server to continue
- ☐ Typical Unix Name space:
 - ☐ /afs/cs.cmu.edu/user/....

Coda -- Play AFS again with

- ☐ All servers R/W, conflicts and resolution
- ☐ disconnected operation ... assume cache is correct if can't contact server
- ☐ hoarding in cache

NFS - Network File System

- ☐ Not a true DFS
- ☐ Used to provide files across a collection of workstations
- ☐ Stateless vs. Stateful
 - ☐ NFS (original) uses UDP (NFS V4 is stateful, uses TCP)
 - ☐ Server going down and back up doesn't "kill" the connection
- ☐ Very little local caching

Distributed Coordination (Not in current Text)

Previous versions of Silberschatz had this in it. Slides from 6e:

<http://www.wiley.com/college/silberschatz6e/0471417432/slides/pdf2/mod17.2.pdf>

Process Coordination across a distributed system

- On a single machine (even multi-core) it is easy to determine the order of events
- Can get things like locks done "easily" on a distributed system?

Event ordering in a message passing situation

- Happened-Before Relation
 - A and B are events in the same process, $A \rightarrow B$ (A before B)
 - A sending, B receiving a message, $A \rightarrow B$
 - Transitive: $A \rightarrow B$, $B \rightarrow C$, then $A \rightarrow C$
- Notice dependence on messages for inter-process ordering.
- Also, $A \rightarrow A$ can never hold ... irreflexive, partial ordering

Event Ordering

☐ Implementation

- ☐ Each process has a "clock"
- ☐ Each "event" increments this clock
- ☐ Each message is tagged with this clock
- ☐ If message $M = \langle D, C \rangle$ (D = data, C = clock) and $C > \text{local } C$
 - ☐ set local C to $C+1$
- ☐ Total ordering by ordering events in process order if all C s are the same

Mutual Exclusion in a distributed environment

Centralized Algorithm

- ☐ One process becomes the "coordinator"
 - ☐ Messages: request, reply, release
 - ☐ reply is not sent back until we can assure mutual exclusion
- ☐ Coordinator process dies?
 - ☐ pick a new one, reconstruct the queue

Mutual Exclusion

Fully Distributed Algorithm

- ☐ Much harder!
- ☐ Using Ordering from above ...
- ☐ Entry on process i
 - ☐ sends message request(P_i , TS) to all processes (TS timestamp)
 - ☐ A process receives the request sends back a reply
 - ☐ if not in a critical section
 - ☐ or when it completes its critical section
 - ☐ or if waiting, compare TS in request with self request TS
 - ☐ send if request TS < self TS
- ☐ When replies from ALL processes are received, start CR

<slide series done>

